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FTC Authority To Order Compulsory
Trademark Licensing: Is
"Realemon" Really Real Lemon?
William J. Keating*
I. Introduction
In two cases of first impression, In re Borden, Inc.' and FTC v.
Formica Corp., 2 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) asserted that
it has the authority to order the novel remedies of compulsory trade-
mark licensing3 and trademark cancellation. While the FTC has
broad statutory authority to proscribe acts of "unfair competition,"4
this article suggests that compulsory trademark licensing represents
an unwarranted extension of the power of the FTC.5 In addition,
arguments typically offered to justify use of this remedy rest on mis-
conceptions concerning the nature and origin of trademark rights.6
Further, the enforcement of antitrust policy with this severe form of
trademark relief undermines the established policy of vigorous en-
forcement of trademark rights as a means of preventing consumer
confusion.7
II. In re Borden, Inc.
The remedy of compulsory trademark licensing was first consid-
ered in proceedings by the FTC against Borden for unlawfully main-
* B.S. 1947 Canisius College; J.D. 1954 Georgetown University; Professor of Law,
Dickinson School of Law. The author wishes to express his appreciation to J. Thomas Morris,
Dickinson School of Law, for his assistance in preparing this article.
1. 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978).
2. United States Patent & Trademark Office, Trademark Cancellation no. 11,955. A
related decision on a procedural matter in this case is .reported in Formica Corp. v. Lefkovitz,
200 U.S.P.Q. 641 (1979).
3. 92 F.T.C. at 774-75.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976) (amending the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)).
5. It is not the author's position, however, that the FTC does not possess de facto au-
thority to fashion and apply new remedies. This article suggests, rather, that compulsory
trademark licensing will have an adverse effect on the consuming public, and that the doctrinal
foundations offered by the FTC for this new remedy are inadequate. See notes 33-36 and
accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
taining monopoly power in the market for reconstituted lemon
juice:' In the initial hearing, the administrative law judge found that
a policy of discriminatory pricing and promotional allowances in ar-
eas threatened by competition9 enabled Borden to gain overwhelm-
ing dominance in thc market for processed lemon juice. 0 The judge
found that the basis, however, of Borden's competitive advantage
was the use of its "Realemon" trademark. "
Finding that Borden had unlawfully maintained its dominant
position, the judge ordered Borden to cease and desist from granting
discriminatory price reductions, promotional allowances and rebates
in restraint of competition.' 2 The most controversial aspect of the
order, however, was a provision compelling Borden to license its
"Realemon" trademark at a nominal royalty to any competitor re-
questing a license for a period of ten years.' 3
On appeal, the full FTC affirmed, in a large part, the decision of
the administrative law judge.'4 The majority of the FTC, however,
considered the remedy of compulsory trademark licensing unneces-
sary,I5 although they gratuitously held that they had authority to or-
der that form of relief.'6 Had the FTC affirmed the trademark relief
ordered by the hearing judge, Borden could have appealed that as-
pect of the order directly to the United States Court of Appeals.' 7
8. In re Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. at 672-74. Reconstituted lemon juice is made from fresh
lemons that are reduced to a concentrate and then diluted with water to the desired strength.
A preservative is also added. It is a highly convenient, inexpensive source of lemon flavoring,
having a long shelf life.
9. Id at 691.
10. Id at 789. Specifically, the administrative law judge found that Borden had consist-
ently possessed a market share of 75-80% during the years under investigation. In addition to
this large market share, Borden was able to sell its "Realemon" lemon juice at a premium of
30% over competitive products even though "Realemon" and competing products were virtu-
ally identical. Id at 745.
I1. Id at 775-78. The notion adopted by the FTC that a trademark itself may be the
basis of monopoly power has been severely criticized. See McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of
a Trademark. Remedy or PenalyZ 67 TRADEMARK RPTR. 197 (1976). Professor McCarthy
contends that a trademark is a mere symbol that is often blamed for monopoly power by those
who fail to engage in "a demanding investigation of the true source of power." Id at 207.
12. In re Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 778 (1978).
13. Id The administrative law judge allowed Borden a nominal royalty of 0.5% of the
dollar sales of reconstituted lemon juice produced and marketed under the trademark.
14. Id at 832. The final order required that Borden cease and desist from (I) granting
price reductions that hinder competition; (2) selling below cost or at unreasonably low prices;
(3) granting promotional allowances that hinder competition. The FTC further maintained
continuing jurisdiction for a ten year period to monitor compliance. Id at 832-33.
15. Id at 779.
16. "*'hie an order requiring licensing or suspension may be ordered as a means of dis-
sipating illegally used or acquired monopoly power, we are mindful that the remedy is a severe
one, and should be imposed only where less drastic means appear unlikely to suffice.
Id at 807 (emphasis added).
In support of this assumed authority, however, the FTC cited cases in which trademarks
were found to be deceptive or misleading.
17. Any person. . . or corporation required by an order of the Commission to cease
and desist from using any method of competition or act or practice may obtain a
review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States, within any circuit
where the method of competition or the act or practice in question was used. ...
The holding of the FTC, that they had authority to order compul-
sory trademark licensing and their refusal to exercise that power, left
Borden without standing to appeal. Consequently, the decision ef-
fectively created self-serving jurisdiction, without the danger of ap-
pellate review.' 8
Assuming the administrative law judge's findings, adopted by
the FTC, that reconstituted lemon juice forms a relevant market;' 9
that Borden's acquired and unlawfully maintained monopoly power
in that market;20 and that the FTC has the power to fashion a rem-
edy to correct abuses resulting from unlawful acts;2 ' the question
arises as to whether or not the FTC has the authority to order com-
pulsory trademark licensing as part of a remedy.
It is difficult to trace the holding of the FTC on the issue of its
authority to grant a compulsory trademark license. The opinion be-
gan by stating that an appropriate order without compulsory trade-
mark licensing should be satisfactory and therefore it was
"unnecessary to reach the question of trademark relief."22 In a foot-
note, however, the opinion concluded, "Should we be wrong in our
assessment of the evidence, of course, it remains open for the Com-
mission to reopen the record to consider entry of the sort of trade-
mark relief that presently appears unnecessary. 23
An argument for the authority of the FTC to order compulsory
trademark licensing is found in the separate opinion of Commis-
sioner Pertschuk on the issue of relief.24 Commissioner Pertschuk
agreed with the majority, but further indicated that he would advo-
cate some form of trademark relief such as compulsory trademark
licensing. Such relief, however, is clearly not ideal. If instituted,
Upon the filing of the record with it, the jurisdiction of the court of appeals of the
United States to affirm, enforce, modify, or set aside orders of the Commission shall
be exclusive.
15 U.S.C. § 45(c)-(d) (1976).
18. Undoubtedly, the FTC, the Justice Department, or defendants in trademark infringe-
ment cases will cite In re Borden in support of the proposition that compulsory trademark
licensing is a suitable remedy to promote competition. An opportunity to test the FTC author-
ity to compel trademark licensing presents itself in a recent antitrust suit against three cereal
manufacturers: Kellogg; General Mills; and General Foods. See In re Kellogg Co., Docket
No. 8883 (F.T.C. Sept. 30, 1980), reported in, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 983,
A6 (Oct. 2, 1980). While the ruling is mere obiter dicta, over a period of time this type of
decision assumes a mantle of authority to the degree that it eventually becomes unclear what is
obiter and what is dicta.
19. In re Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 784 (1978).
20. Id at 792.
21. Id at 806.
22. Id at 779. The FTC stated that a suitable order could be formed without requiring
compulsory trademark licensing. Commissioner Pertschuk dissented on this issue in a separate
opinion. Id at 809.
23. Id at 809.
24. Id Commissioner Pertschuk cited a book review by Professor Scherer, Scherer, The
Fosrerian Harvest: Separating Wheat From Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974 (1977), as his authority. It
is questionable whether a book review should be raised to the dignity of controlling authority
to justify such a serious remedy.
there would be risks of weakened quality control, additional inspec-
tion costs, loss of scale economies, and added information-processing
burdens on consumers.25 Instituting a form of trademark relief that
entails such risks is better left to congressional rather than FTC deci-
26sion.
The strongest argument in favor of the authority of the FTC to
grant compulsory trademark licensing is found by an analogy to
compulsory patent licensing.27 Compulsory patent licensing has be-
come a well accepted remedy in cases in which a patent was instru-
mental in effecting an illegal act.28 Although no statutory authority
exists for such a remedy, it has grown gradually from consent de-
crees.2 9 Assuming that such relief is proper in patent cases, it does
not follow that it is also appropriate in trademark cases. The patent
grant gives the owner the exclusive right to preclude others from
practicing the invention, for the life of the patent.30 Such a grant is
created by the government and given to the inventor in exchange for
disclosure of the technological innovation a.3  This concept, which
did not exist at common-law, is purely statutory. The government,
having created the rights, has authority to determine their extent as
well as the conditions under which they may be restricted or extin-
guished.
3 2
Trademark rights, however, are not created by the government.
They are created by the trademark owner through the marketing of
trademarked goods or services. The trademark results from the com-
mercial interplay between the trademark owner and its customers.
33
The government can only restrict or extinguish it to the extent that it
has specific authority to exercise jurisdiction over personal prop-
erty.34 Confusion frequently arises in distinguishing between the
concepts of trademark rights and trademark registration. Registra-
25. Although Professor Scherer recognized these risks, he dismissed them as, "in (his)
judgment, slight." Scherer, supra note 24, at 999.
26. An amicus brief filed in the Borden case on behalf of the United States Trademark
Association raises an additional problem. The brief points to an increasing trend toward hold-
ing trademark licensors responsible for product liability resulting from the use of the licensee
products. 69 TRADEMARK RPTR. 265, 271 (1978).
27. In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. at 810.
28. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); American Cyana-
mid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747 (1963), vacated andremanded on other grounds, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.
1966). Patent licensing has also been used as a remedy to dissipate monopoly power when the
patent was not implicated in the antitrust violation. See United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 351 (D. Mass. 1953), afdper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
29. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 251-93 (1976). Mention of this specific remedy is conspic-
uously absent.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976).
31. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
32. The government's authority is limited only in cases in which the restrictions are dis-
criminatory, arbitrary or capricious.
33. See S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRAcTIcES AND CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION 51 (3d ed. 1974).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
tion is a government created instrument that merely records the
trademark owner's title to the trademark. The registration does not
create any rights, it merely acknowledges and records them. The
government could conceivably withdraw a trademark registration
under proper conditions.35 Such a withdrawal, however, would not
affect the trademark owner's rights in the mark since such rights exist
independently of the registration.36
Compulsory trademark licensing is subject to the constitutional
provisions that forbid the governmental taking of property without
due process of law.37 Commissioner Pertschuk's opinion cites Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States38 for the proposition that divestiture of
stock or physical assets is a common form of antitrust relief.39 Stan-
dard Oil, however, is limited to situations in which the personal
property was wrongfully acquired in an arrangement that consti-
tuted an antitrust violation.4 0 When an illegal merger occurs, a di-
vestiture of the assets of the merger is an obvious remedy. This does
not, however, justify the generalization that the FTC can deprive a
trademark owner of personal property rights merely because it has
concluded that the owner has a dominant share of a relevant market.
The FTC also cited United States v. General Electric Co.4 as
further support for its position. General Electric concerned an at-
tempt by the government to cancel the General Electric trademark
"Mazda" since it was being shared with Westinghouse. The thrust of
the government's argument was that "a trademark cannot serve two
masters and since it was employed by General Electric and Westing-
house, its use was an imposition on the public. ' 42 It is difficult to
reconcile General Electric and Borden since a much greater imposi-
tion on the public would occur if the FTC required a trademark
owner to license all competitors.
The Supreme Court cases relied upon by the FTC to support its
authority to order compulsory trademark licensing are even less
helpful to the FTC position. In Siegel v. FTC4 3 respondent Siegel
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976).
36. Chairman Pertschuk apparently does not understand this distinction since he refers
to a trademark as a "creature of the law." In re Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. at 811-12 n.2.
A dramatic illustration of the FTC's authority would be to assume that Borden had de-
cided not to register the trademark "Realemon." Borden would still have the same substantive
rights and could prevent others from using a similar mark on similar goods. It would merely
give up certain procedural rights that simplify proof in a trademark litigation proceeding. 15
U.S.C. § 11-15 (1976). It is difficult to see how the FTC could order compulsory licensing of
the common-law trademark, which is private personal property.
37. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
38. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
39. In re Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. at 810 n.1.
40. 221 U.S. at 77-82.
41. 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
42. Id at 858-59.
43. 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
marketed overcoats under the trademark "ALPACUNA." The
products sold by Siegel were comprised of various materials includ-
ing alpaca, mohair, wool and cotton, but not vicuna. The FTC took
the position that the trademark implied that vicuna was one of the
materials and that customers would be deceived by the use of the
trademark. The Supreme Court held that instead of denying Siegel
its trademark, justice could be equally served by requiring Siegel to
employ qualifying language to inform purchasers that vicuna was
not one of the materials included." Furthermore, the Supreme
Court emphasized the personal property attributes of trademarks
and the inadvisability of depriving trademark holders of a valuable
asset without regard for due process of law.45
Chairman Pertschuk's separate opinion46 on the issue of relief
adopts the rationale of the initial opinion of the administrative law
judge, but suggests that stronger measures are necessary to end Bor-
den's "unlawful monopoly."47 The rationale is that since the trade-
mark is the offending vehicle, the remedy should include relief that
controls or limits Borden's use of the trademark. As an alternative to
compulsory trademark licensing, Chairman Pertschuk suggests that
the FTC could enjoin Borden's use of the trademark for a fixed pe-
riod of time.48 Such an injunction would eliminate the difficulties of
quality control and reasonableness of royalty charges inherent in
trademark licensing.49
Commissioner Clanton concurred in the initial opinion of the
administrative law judge, but added that he would formulate relief
based upon an order prohibiting Borden from selling below its aver-
age variable cost.5 ° This cost would include advertising and promo-
tional expenditures as well as administrative overhead. Such items
would produce a costing determination that would permit other
manufacturers to compete on the basis of price. Commissioner
44. Id at 610.
45. Id at 612-14. Another Supreme Court case cited by the FTC was essentially to the
same effect. In FTC v. Royal Milling, 288 U.S. 212 (1932), respondents were "blenders" of
grain rather than "millers." The FTC felt that this was a significant distinction and that the
trade name "Royal Milling" misled the public. Again the Sutpreme Court refused to institute
the relief of precluding respondent from using the trade name when the use of qualifying
language would be equally satisfactory. Id
46. In re Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. at 809.
47. Id
48. Id at 812. The Chairman suggests that such action would not be "confiscatory"
without citing any authority or explaining his reasoning. Id Ironically, however, the cases
later cited by the Chairman to support compulsory trademark licensing indicate that the
remedy is somewhat confiscatory. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); FTC v.
Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
49. In re Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. at 812. Chairman Pertschuk's final conclusion was that
he would order some form of trademark relief, but that he would permit the parties to submit
additional briefs on the issue. Id at 813.
50. Id at 814.
51. Id
Clanton saw no need for trademark relief and realized that such re-
lief would create a potential for consumer confusion.
52
Although concurring with the initial opinion of the administra-
tive law judge, Commissioner Pitofsky proposed a narrower rem-
edy. 3 Recognizing that Borden could charge a premium price due
to the brand loyalty it had achieved," the Commissioner suggested
factoring the cost of past advertising and promotional expenses into
the current variable cost figure. 55 This formula would then be used
to determine whether Borden's pricing policies were predatory. 6
With this formula, Borden would be unable to respond to lower
prices to meet competition. New competitors would therefore be
able to enter the market. Commissioner Pitofsky concluded that al-
though the FTC could enjoin trademark use, such relief was unnec-
essary since the remedy he proposed would give the domimant
company some leeway to respond to aggressive competition without
precluding market entry by an equally or more efficient competi-
tor.5
7
Commissioner Pitofsky's opinion recognizes the reality of the
market place and the motivation of merchants in a profit-oriented
society. Borden located a consumer need for reconstituted lemon
juice. It moved quickly and efficiently to establish and capture the
market by skill and foresight, without oppressive or unfair conduct.
It was rewarded for its efforts with an 80% market share of a product
with excellent profitability. Numerous business activities, such as in-
creased efficiency, patents, leases, advertising and trademarks are in-herently exclusionary. 58 The business with a major market share
should not be denied the benefit of such activities, which are in and
of themselves legal, to promote business or respond to incipient com-
petition. A "rule of reason" analysis should be applied to exclusion-
ary practices used by a business with a major market share to
acquire or defend that market share. This would foster the competi-
tive process and also maintain harmony with the objectives of the
antitrust laws.59
III. Formica
Another attack on the trademark system occurred in FTC v.
52. Id at 816.
53. Id at 817.
54. Id at 828.
55. Id at 829.
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id at 819.
59. Id at 822. Commissioner Pitofsky would, however, apply stricter standards to the
monopolist than the non-monopolist. Id at 820.
Formica Corp. 60 This case concerned the well known trademark
"Formica," used for laminated sheets of wood, fabric or paper im-
pregnated with resin.6' The FTC instituted action under section
fourteen of the Lanham Act, 62 which gives the FTC authority to can-
cel a registered trademark that has become a common descriptive
name of the article. The FTC took the position that purchasers of
laminated sheet material employ the term "Formica" to identify a
generic class of materials rather than the Formica Corporation as a
particular source of such goods.63 If this has happened, the term
"Formica" has lost its trademark status and has fallen into the public
domain.'
The motivation of the FTC in bringing an action to cancel a
registered trademark is not clear. Such an action is usually brought
by competitors having an interest in the outcome or is raised as a
defense to a trademark infringement suit. Apparently the FTC has
determined that Formica Corporation has a disproportionate share
of the market and is seeking to correct the matter by bringing an
action to cancel the trademark.
In an unprecedented action, Congress responded to the FTC
suit by adopting a bill that withholds funds from the FTC that would
be used to prosecute cancellation of the "Formica" trademark.65
The specter of the FTC as a super agency bringing cancellation pro-
ceedings against famous trademarks, without an actual controversy,
was apparently too chilling for Congress. Although the FTC retains
its authority to petition for cancellation of a trademark, 66 this au-
thority should be exercised only in situations in which the trademark
is used in a deceptive manner or to misrepresent the source of the
goods, not to correct what the FTC perceives as a market share dislo-
cation.
60. United States Patent & Trademark Office, Trademark Cancellation no. 11,955.
61. The trademark "Formica," owned by Formica Corporation, a division of American
Cyanamid, has been continuously used since 1928 to designate its brand of product.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976).
63. United States Patent & Trademark Office, Trademark Cancellation no. 11,955.
64. This fate accompanied the over-successful popularity of such products as "aspirin,"
"escalator," "nylon," and other famous trademarks that now identify the product rather than
the manufacturer of the product.
65. H.R. 2313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The bill was signed by President Carter on
May 28, 1980. Federal Trade Commission Authorization Bill of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252
(1980).
66. The FTC was originally instituted to provide effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. I1I, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41, 44, 45, 52-58 (1976), broadened the powers of the FTC to protect consumers.
See Kintner & Smith, The Emergence ofthe Federal Trade Commission as-a Formidable Con-
sumer ProtectionAgency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1975). One justifiable instance in which the
FTC might seek trademark cancellation is to remedy an unfair trade practice in which the
trademark is being used deceptively. See Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles Ltd. v. FTC, 129
U.S.P.Q. 258 (1961).
IV. Conclusion
The FTC has a charter to protect fair competition and restrict
commercial practices that tend to deceive or mislead consumers. Its
recent activities, tending to destroy trademark protection which fos-
ter brand competition, are counter-productive. Consumers, who
have relied upon well established trademark protection, would be
denied the assurance of quality endorsed by the trademark owner if
compulsory trademark licensing is adopted. In re Borden exempli-
fies a situation in which the FTC has assumed authority to compel
industry-wide trademark licensing, without properly considering the
consumer confusion that is likely to result. The Formica case com-
prises an attempt by the FTC to deprive a trademark owner of valu-
able property rights to promote the FTC's concept of fair market
share. More stringent controls on the FTC's authority in these areas
are necessary to guide them in protecting the consumer while also
maintaining a fair system of brand competition, insured by the
trademark system.

